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differences in trust relating to regulative, impartial institutions, trust in political, governmental institutions,
and general social trust between citizens. Further, this study finds that more democratic countries,
countries with parliamentary systems of government, and a majoritarian system of elections are
associated with higher levels of trust.
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Holding the Public Trust: Forms of Trust in Democratic Countries and Their Determinants
By: David Werner
Abstract
Across both established and newly established democracies, notions of trust
in government appear to be falling. These realities prompt investigations into both
the determinations of trust in government and its positive relationship to
democracy. A host of literature supports institutional approach theory, posting that
the overarching government system predominantly determines trust. Analyzing
survey questions at the country-level across 16 countries from the World Values
Survey (WVS) Waves 5 - 7, this research affirms differences in trust relating to
regulative, impartial institutions, trust in political, governmental institutions, and
general social trust between citizens. Further, this study finds that more
democratic countries, countries with parliamentary systems of government, and a
majoritarian system of elections are associated with higher levels of trust.

Introduction
Contemporary literature highlights the phenomenon of declining trust in
government (Pharr & Putnam, 2000; Dalton, 2004; Van de Walle et al., 2008; Foster
& Frieden, 2017). While most of these studies focus on established democracies in
North America and Western Europe, there is evidence of declining trust across
democracies in different regions as well (Cloete, 2007; Bratton & Gyimah-Boadi,

2016; Lee et al., 2020). Contemporary manifestations of distrust in government
include demonstrations against austerity measures, police brutality, and maskwearing mandates (Lee, 2018; Brooks, 2020; Hapuhennedige, 2020). The rise of
populism may be a result of declining trust in government as well (Inglehart &
Norris, 2016).
What does the reality of declining trust in democratic governance mean?
Many authors highlight the importance of trust in legitimizing democratic
government and emphasize the essential role trust plays in the promotion of
democracy (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Danaee Fard & Anvary Rostamy, 2007; Van
der Meer, 2010; Beshi & Kaur, 2020). Without adequate trust in government, the
legitimacy of government is at stake, as citizens question whether their
government is invested in their well-being (Della Porta, 2012). Therefore,
understanding the component parts of trust in government and the reasons
underlying its observed decline are essential to improving global democratic
performance.
“Trust in Government” is a metric which represents citizens’ evaluation of
their government’s willingness to respond to their concerns, and, in turn,
government’s reliability and accountability to its constituencies (Van de Meer,
2010). Here, government refers to the current regime and its institutions, not to the
state as such. Government, however, is not necessarily thought of as one
amorphous being by citizens; rather, a division between trust in partial,

representative institutions of government (i.e. legislatures, political parties) and
“impartial”, regulative state institutions (i.e. the armed forces, the legislative
system, the civil service) is a necessary distinction. Studies find consistently that
citizens have greater trust in the latter institutions of government than the former
(Rothstein & Stolle, 2008). Much of the attention on declining levels of trust is
concentrated on governmental institutions; regulative institutions appear to be
more robust and continue to garner substantial support and confidence. This is
often explained using Easton’s idea of specific vs. diffuse support — the former,
referring to policies and actions of actors, is applied to governmental institutions
while the latter, referring to a generalized attachment to the democratic regime, is
applied to regulative institutions (Easton, 1975).
Underlying causes of this decline of trust in government are varied; much of
the literature focuses on individual and institution factors (Foster & Frieden, 2017).
While there are individual factors that affect one’s trust in government (i.e.
proximity to government services, socioeconomic characteristics), it is
hypothesized that the actual systems of government impact subsequent trust in
government the most (Christensen & Lægreid, 2005; Dunleavy, 1980; Anderson &
Tverdova, 2003). This viewpoint is drawn heavily from institutional approach
theory, which, according to Foster and Frieden (2017), argues that “the capacity and
effectiveness of bureaucracies, the structure and design of constitutional and
electoral systems, and/or the level of national policy autonomy, condition citizen

views on government” (p. 9). Good [or sound] governance may act as a rainmaker;
just as the gentle rain from heaven falls on the just and unjust alike, competent
governance impacts all constituencies’ trust (Newton et al., 2018). Alongside
competence, cohesion and clarity in government policy is likely to have positive
impacts on trust; so too is government and electoral system responsiveness to
citizens’ varied demands (Miller & Borrelli, 1991).
Focusing first on the component parts of trust in government, determinants
of such trust are considered based on a review of the literature below and findings
supporting the institutional approach theory of this paper. Analyzing the difference
in trust between regulative and governmental institutions, evidence of
contemporary decline in trust in government, and system-wide determinants of
trust, this paper attempts to highlight the importance in understanding how trust
in government is shaped and what avenues are available for democratic countries
to re-establish trust among their citizens.
Understanding Trust in Government: Defining its Component Parts
To better understand “trust in government,” an understanding of the
definitions of “trust” and “government” is necessary. Social scientists differentiate
trust as “social” and “institutional”. Government, in turn, is understood as either the
entire governing apparatus or specific institutions defined along political or nonpolitical lines (Warren, 2018; Newton et al., 2018). Much of the existing literature
overlooks the need to define what they mean by “trust in government,” resulting in

some confusion over the measure. For instance, Hardin (2000) asks “is trust in
government analogous to trust in another person, or is it a very different notion?”
(p. 31). What, then, is trust, and how can it be meaningfully applied to the
government?
Of the various definitions of trust proposed across the social sciences, the
definition by Rousseau et al. (1998) is favored: “[t]rust is a psychological state
comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations
of the intentions or behavior of another” (p. 395). According to this definition, trust
has an inherently positive quality, thus defining away uses of trust in the negative.
This definition implies the object of trust (i.e. government, fellow citizens) is
intrinsically committed to the subject and predictable in their behavior, evaluated
through the consistency of their past behavior — that is, for trust to have any
relevance, the object of trust must be trustworthy (Van de Meer,2010; Warren,
2018).
Subjects and objects of trust exist at differing proximities; social and
institutional trust allow for an examination of the distance that exists between
them. The former considers attitudes of citizens towards other citizens while the
latter involves citizens’ attitudes toward government structures and institutional
apparatuses (Newton et al., 2018). Institutional trust is the type of trust involved in
our understanding of “trust in government,” though the relationship between social
and institutional trust is not discrete. Both forms are mutually reinforcing, though

the literature is divided on which form precedes which (Sønderskov & Dinesen,
2016; Newton & Norris, 2016). However, the strength of the relationship between
these two forms of trust depends heavily on the system of government considered.
In democratic countries, where one’s fellow citizens have direct say in the forming
of regimes, social trust is likely to have a much bigger impact on institutional trust
than in less representative forms of government. It would be difficult to trust a
government formed by the people without first trusting in the people. At the same
time, certain regimes may intentionally degrade trust between citizens. Nationalist
and fascist governments often target marginalized populations within a country to
blame for economic or political hardships (Schehr, 2005). Therefore, focusing solely
on institutional trust in our understanding of trust in government neglects the
importance of relationships between citizens.
Similar to trust, government is a term with varied definitions. Whether notions
of trust in government refers to the active government in charge (ruling party), the
entirety of the government apparatus, specific institutions of government, or some
combination thereof is necessary to consider. The literature reviewed distinguishes
primarily between political, governmental institutions and “non-political”, regulative
institutions of government in the analysis of trust (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008).
Generally, regulative institutions elicit more trust from the general public than do
governmental institutions — as Warren (2018) notes, “those who hold positions
within these parts of government—civil servants, judges, appointed regulators, and

the like—are said to hold a “public trust”” (p. 79). There are many instances when such
non-political institutions become political (i.e. in cases of a military coup, political
appointments of judges) and this distinction is complicated. Many ruling regimes are
able to appoint ideologues to such “non-political” positions, undermining their
legitimacy and stated independence. In comparing bureaucracy under the
Washington system and the Westminster system, Moe & Caldwell (1994) find that the
former attempts to insulate agencies from ongoing control while the latter is granted
discretion and coordinates with the ruling regime (pp. 171–195). The overarching
system of government — here, presidential or parliamentary — is seen to have
important implications on other government apparatuses and subsequent trust in
them.
But differences between governments are not solely based on their differing
forms. Indeed, it is important to contextualize government on a country-by-county
basis; in considering the United States, King (2000) finds that, “Americans are
brought up to idolize, almost literally, both their governmental system, as embodied
in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, and the heroes of American
political history” (p. 85). Following, it is important to consider in what ways the
history of the country is intertwined with its current government apparatuses. In
many European countries, pre-existing kingdoms fell and merged to create the
modern countries in question; in many African, Asian, and Latin American countries,
the government structure is inherited from colonial governments (King, 2000). How

the history of these institutions formed and emerged may carry over into
contemporary feelings of trust in them.
Trust in government is also determined by citizens’ own views regarding the
appropriate positioning of government vis-a-vis their lives. But such views are in part
shaped by the very governments they are under. If governments normalize a welfare
system and their central role in assuring quality of life, citizens likely will accept such
a role. Compare this to quotes by varying American presidents: Kennedy’s “ask not
what your country can do for you — ask what you can do for your country” and
Reagan’s “government is not the solution to our problems; government is the
problem” lines in their inaugural address reinforce an individualist, do-it-yourself
mentality that pervades American politics. In these diverse ways, it seems systemlevel factors have profound impacts on overall understandings of both trust in, and
place of, government.

Relationship Between Trust and Liberal Democracy
Although much of the literature agrees with the centrality of trust to
democratic legitimacy, there are some who disagree with its importance. Indeed, the
theoretical groundings of liberal democracies encourage — if not outright
necessitate — a healthy skepticism in governmental institutions. Della Porta (2012)
theorizes “a sort of “critical” (mis)trust… [as] not only proper to democratic citizens,
but also as necessary to perform democratic control” (p. 42). Following, other authors
claim that democracy and trust have a paradoxical relationship (Christensen &

Lægreid, 2005; Warren, 2018). Indeed, as mentioned above regarding governmental
institutions’ influence over regulative institutions, citizens who have an implicit trust
in institutions should have a healthy skepticism about what political officials do with
them.
Although skepticism is important to democracies, it would be erroneous to
conclude that democracies thrive on distrust; historically, liberals such as Alexis de
Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill emphasized the importance of at least social trust
in order to sustain democracy (Newton & Norris, 2016). While the ideal level of trust
in democratic governments is impossible to determine, it is not impossible to
determine the change in trust across several established democracies. That
democratic governments have been experiencing a decline in trust over the past few
decades is well established in the literature (Van de Walle et al., 2008; Foster &
Frieden, 2017). The theorized reasons for this decline in trust are multifaceted,
though predominantly attributable to the overarching systems of government
(Katzenstein, 2000). It is important to synthesize some of these proposed reasons for
substantial declines in trust experienced.

Factors Affecting Trust as Identified in the Literature
Factors that have been analyzed in reviewed literature are concerned either
with the individual or the institution. Individual variables include socioeconomic
status, demographic variables, and political leanings (Newton & Norris, 2016).

Institution variables include transparency, levels of corruption, macroeconomic
performance, electoral system, system of governance, and existence of a welfare
state (Anderson & Tverdoka, 2003; Newton & Norris, 2016; Katzenstein, 2000).
One’s own trust in the government is influenced by a myriad of demographic
factors. Specifically, the literature has found that higher educated, rich individuals
have more trust in government relative to lower educated, poor individuals
(Christensen & Lægreid, 2005; Foster & Frieden, 2017). Placement between “winners
and losers” of the global neoliberal economic system is one framing of this finding.
Winners (high education, high economic status, high health, winning side of party
competition) and losers (low education, low economic status, low health, losing side
of party competition) are not necessarily discrete groupings, but such crude framing
is interesting to consider with notable economic inequality a reality for many liberal
democratic countries (Ortiz & Cummins, 2011). Political ideologies appear to have an
effect on trust as well, insomuch as individuals on the right end of the spectrum are
relatively less trusting of government than those on the left (Lægreid, 1993).
Proximity to the public sector has an effect as well, as public sector employees are
found to be more trusting of the government.
The line between individual and institutional factors is blurred when it comes
to individual perceptions of said institutions. For instance, the perceptions of
bureaucratic efficiency may be more important in considering trust in government
than any objective metric of efficiency; the same can be said of transparency. An

individual’s own understanding of what services the government ought to provide
influences their view on trust (as can be abstracted from political ideologies
mentioned above) (Aberbach & Rockman, 2000). Additionally, the contemporary
move towards post-material interests by governments appear not to be well received
by economically struggling citizens (Inglehart, 1990).
Nevertheless, many institutional determinants of trust supersede these
considerations. Investigating the effects of corruption, as measured via the
Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Anderson & Tverdova (2003) conclude that
“individuals in countries with higher levels of corruption evaluate the performance
of the political system more negatively” (p. 99). Security concerns are another
important determinant; surveys in America after 9/11 found citizen trust in
government significantly higher than pre-9/11 surveys had (Chanley, 2002). A
government’s established electoral system and the impact of a two- or multi-party
system have been found to influence trust. For instance, in a comparative analysis of
trust in government between the United States, Sweden, and Norway, Miller &
Listhaug (1990) find that “the flexibility of the party system… [is] an explanation for
varying degrees of trust in the different countries” (p. 367). As multi-party systems
are, theoretically, more flexible than two-party systems, there is evidence to support
that the electoral system has an independent influence on trust, apart from
ideological viewpoints. In these diverse ways, the institutional realities of

government have the most profound impacts on citizens’ subsequent

trust in

government.

Empirical Analysis: Difference in Trust
Much of the literature supports two claims: regulative institutions are
thought of differently than governmental institutions and general levels of trust in
government are falling (Schneider, 2017; Van de Walle et al., 2008). In order to
empirically test these two claims, survey questions on trust in government
organizations from the World Value Survey (WVS) Waves 5 to 7 are compared (see
Table A). As the WVS does not distribute surveys to the exact same countries
throughout the 3 waves studied, a sample of 16 countries from various regions are
selected. This random sampling of countries allows for a glimpse into what appears
to be a global reduction in trust in government.
To determine if levels of trust are significantly different across the 3 waves
studied, a similar aggregation and comparison is conducted. Responses of “A great
deal” and “Quite a lot” are aggregated to represent the proportion of respondents
who “trust” in the listed organizations. F-tests are used to see if differences in trust
levels are significantly different.

Table A
Trust
Survey

Institutional Trust: Regulative
I am going to name a number of

Institutional Trust: Governmental
I am going to name a number of

Question

Answer Choices

organizations. For each one, could you tell me
how much confidence you have in them: is it
a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of
confidence, not very much confidence or none
at all?

organizations. For each one, could you tell me
how much confidence you have in them: is it
a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of
confidence, not very much confidence or none
at all?

- The Armed Forces - Justice System/Courts
- The Police
- The Civil Services

- The Government
-- The Political Parties

1. A great deal
2. Quite a lot

1. A great deal
2. Quite a lot

3. Not very much
4. None at all

- The Parliament
[Legislature]
3. Not very much
4. None at all

The results of an f-test comparing the proportion of respondents’ trust levels
between regulative and governmental institutions across the 3 waves and 16
countries studied is found below (Table B). The results indicate that these forms of
government institutions are thought of differently and that regulative institutions
are trusted more than governmental, as supported in the literature (Cinar & UgurCinar, 2018). In fact, across the 16 countries studied, regulative institutions are
trusted nearly 30% more than are governmental institutions.

Table B
Institutional Trust: Regulative

Institutional Trust: Governmental

Mean

0.52

0.28

Variance

0.03

0.02

Observations

46

47

P(T<=t)
t Critical one-tail

8.9867E-12
1.66342017

There are various reasons why trust in regulative institutions are trusted
more than governmental institutions. The former typically corresponds to “diffuse
support” while the later corresponds with “specific support”; that is, regulative
institutions capture deep-seated attitudes towards overarching political
institutions while governmental institutions capture satisfaction with the regime in
power at a particular moment (Easton, 1975). Thus, evaluations of governmental
institutions likely capture more current dissatisfactions than regulative institutions.
To turn now towards evidence of changing trust across time, the proportions
of social, governmental institution, and regulative institution trust across the 16
countries are compared between the 3 waves. Social trust is constructed from a
WVS survey question similarly to the constructions of institutional trusts;
responses of “Most people can be trusted” at the country level represent
proportions of social trust (see Table C).

Table C
Trust

Social Trust

Survey
Question

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very
careful in dealing with people?

Answer
Choices

1. Most people can be trusted
2. Need to be very careful

Despite evidence to the contrary in the literature, we find that trust levels
between waves 5, 6, and 7 of the WVS are stagnant (see Table D). In fact, there may
be some evidence that trust levels are rising, although no change is found to be

significantly different when f-tests are run. This is likely due to the small sample
size and random countries selected to study.

Table D
Trust Across
Time

Institutional Trust:
Regulative

Institutional Trust:
Governmental

Social Trust

Wave 5

.499

.289

.247

Wave 6

.521

.295

.251

Wave 7

.512

.296

.237

These results are surprising, particularly because the time period these
survey waves were conducted (2005-2009, 2010-2014, 2017-2020) corresponds to
the rise of populism around the world (Bosetta & Husted, 2017). Populism is
theorized to result, at least in part, from dissatisfaction and distrust of political
institutions; therefore, populism and government trust is expected to have an
inverse relationship (Algan et al, 2017). However, such findings may be the result of
a relatively small sample size. The 16 countries chosen are a random assortment of
democratic countries that poorly reflect specific regional, political, cultural, and/or
economic realities that influence trust differently.

Empirical Analysis: Determinants of Trust
Having established there is a statistically significant difference between
governmental and regulative institutional trust, we turn now towards

understanding the determinants underpinning both social and institutional trust.
The inclusion of social trust here is predicated on the assumption that social trust
influences, or is influenced by, the two forms of institutional trust outlined (Newton
et al., 2018). Therefore, there is reason to believe government systems will have an
impact on this form of trust alongside the two forms of institutional trust.
Following institutional theory, the research design for this project consists of
analyzing various institutional variables’ impacts on trust. To do this, a multivariate
OLS regression analysis is conducted to evaluate if relationships between these
forms of trust and institutional variables exist. The system of government
(presidential vs parliamentary, federal vs. unitary), electoral system (majoritarian vs.
proportional), and regime type (as represented by the Economist Intelligence Unit's
Democracy Index) are considered (see Table E). All 16 countries across the 3 waves
of the EVS are included; where information is missing, countries are dropped.

Table E
Variables

Description

Institutional Trust: Regulative
[REGULATIVE]

See Table A

Institutional Trust: Governmental
[GOVERNMENTAL]

See Table A

Social Trust [SOCIAL]

See Table B

EIU Score
[EIU]

Numeric variable based on how democratic a country is; the higher the
score (out of 10), the more democratic the country

Electoral System
[ELECTION]

Categorical variable; 0 if proportional, 1 if majoritarian, 2 if mixed

System of Government: Head
[EXEC]

Dummy variable; 0 if presidential, 1 if parliamentary

System of Government: Power
[POWER]

Dummy variable; 0 if unitary, 1 if federal

There are many reasons to believe the system of government has an effect
on trust. Political scientists have considered the differences between presidential
and parliamentary systems for decades, complaining of fragmentation and deadlock
under the former and cohesion and effectiveness under the latter (Moe & Caldwell,
1994). As a key component of our notion of trust in government is competence and
reliability, parliamentary systems are hypothesized to result in higher levels of trust
among the citizenry. In terms of whether a government operating under a unitary
or federal system of government leads to higher levels of trust, the effects are
similar. Federal systems, more so than unitary systems, are able to both
accommodate regional needs and different groups of the electorate (Elazar, 2016).
Having both regional and national governments operating in their own spheres of
influence likely results in greater trust among the citizens. The electoral system has
less obvious effects on trust than these systems of government considered.
Majoritarian systems typically involve less political parties than do proportional
systems, allowing a smaller range of political opinions through to government.
Additionally, trust effects produced by either system will have to do with whether
or not the individual citizen voted for the ruling party/coalition or for the losing
party/coalition. As Anderson & Guillory (1997) find,

Losers in systems that are more consensual [proportional] display higher
levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works than do losers in
systems with majoritarian characteristics… conversely, winners tend to be
more satisfied with democracy the more a country's political institutions
approximate pure majoritarian government (p. 66).
There are thus no hypothesized effects on how electoral systems will impact overall
levels of trust. The last variable considered, regime type, is represented by the EIU’s
Democracy Index. This index is constructed from electoral process and pluralism,
civil liberties, the functioning of government, political participation, and political
culture. Based on these collective scores, countries are ranked and categorized as
either authoritarian (0 - 4), hybrid (4.01 - 6), flawed democracy (6.01 - 8), or full
democracy (8.01 - 10). Only countries that are considered either flawed or full
democracies are compared in this study, as evaluations of institutional trust are
evaluated differently between authoritarian and democratic governments. It is
hypothesized that the more democratic a country is (represented by a higher EIU
score), the higher levels across different forms of trust will be, as the government is
more easily held accountable through the democratic process.
The regression results are found below in Table F. Social trust, regulative
institutional trust, and governmental institutional trust are run separating with the
same variables throughout. EIU score is found to be positive and significant in
determining social and regulative institutional trust; presidential system is found to
be negative and significant in determining social and regulative institutional trust;

proportional system is found to be negative and significant in determining all forms
of trust.
Interestingly, the adjusted R-squared varies substantially across the three
models; the regression model explains 84%, 43% and 12% of the variation in social,
regulative institutional, and governmental institutional trust, respectively. That the
same regression model explains varied percentages of the variance across these
forms of trust indicates that these forms are notably different. It likely indicates the
need for the inclusion of more explanatory and control variables as well, though
this would have been difficult to do given the relatively small sample size.
Table F (standard errors in parentheses)
SOCIAL

regulative

GOVERNMENTAL

EIU_SCORE

0.108***
(0.012)

0.041*
(0.025)

-0.027
(-0.023)

PRESIDENTIAL

-0.062***
(-0.022)

-0.095**
(-0.044)

-0.037
(-0.04)

UNITARY

-0.005
(-0.02)

0.011
(0.04)

-0.013
(-0.037)

PROPORTIONAL

-0.090***
(-0.024)

-0.122***
(-0.048)

-0.103**
(-0.044)

Constant

-0.500***
(-0.098)

0.298
(0.199)

0.554***
(0.182)

Observations

44

43

44

Adjusted R2

0.84

0.434

0.115

F Statistic

57.350*** (df = 4; 39)

9.046*** (df = 4; 38)

2.397* (df = 4; 39)

Note: *Significant at α = 0.10 ; **Significant at α = 0.05 ; ***Significant at α = 0.01.
There are a number of interesting takeaways from the results of the
regression. First, the fact that over the 3 models, social trust is the best predicted

by the regression supports institutional approach theory from which this research
follows. These findings support the notion that the government system promotes
social trust (Bratspies, 2009). Such findings are not altogether novel; Oskarsson
(2010) finds that government performance measures have a large effect on people
with lower social trust (pp. 423-443). Either these findings support that it is the
actual system of government that promotes social trust or that the specific
government systems found to be positive and significant inherently promote sound
government performance.
Looking across the models, there are a key number of variables that are
statistically significant. As represented by the positive and significant relationship
between EIU Score and social and regulative institutional trust, it can be concluded
that democracy promotes greater levels of these forms of trust. Indeed, a 1 point
increase on the EIU score results in a 10% increase in social trust and a 0.5%
increase in regulative institutional trust. It appears that democracy and trust go
hand-in-hand; trust, to quote Van der Meer (2010), is considered to “be the
cornerstone of modern-day democracy” (p. 517).
That presidential systems are negative and significantly related to both social
and regulative institutional trust and that proportional electoral systems relate
similarly to all 3 models is interesting. This indicates that some semblance of
concession, cohesion, and unity promote trust. Presidential systems often result in
gridlock, as opposing parties control the executive and legislative branches (Moe &

Caldwell, 1994). Such realities produce conflicting agendas that make government
policy difficult to follow. Parliamentary systems, where the executive and
legislature are controlled by the same party, results in clearer policy for both
institutions under the government and for the citizenry at large. Similarly,
proportional electoral systems allow for many political opinions to be represented
in government, making it difficult for citizens to agree definitively on any given
platform. Furthermore, policy outcomes (whether positive or negative) under
proportional systems are difficult to attribute to a single party (Criado & Herreros,
2007). Majoritarian systems can therefore be less confusing to citizens and easier to
trust, owing to clearer divisions between parties and regimes.

Conclusions and Synthesis
In considering the ways citizens relate to their governments, trust is an
important metric to understand. This analysis evaluates how different forms of
trust relate to each other and if overarching government systems determine their
values. Following institutional approach theory, we hypothesize that the
overarching systems of government relate directly to different forms of trust. The
results of multivariate regression analyses determining social and institutional trust
support this hypothesis; how democratic a country is, whether a country is
presidential or parliamentary, and whether the election system is majoritarian or
proportional all have effects on varying forms of trust. Such findings support the

notion that overarching systems have impacts on levels of trust. Systems which are
more democratic and allow for more unity and cohesion — majoritarian and
parliamentary — relate positively with trust levels.
Through simple f-tests, we find that there is a marked difference between
regulative institutions and governmental institutions. Furthermore, the former
captures much higher levels of trust than the latter. This indicates the need for
greater competency, reliability, and accountability in governmental institutions to
improve levels of trust. Having higher levels of trust in government is important for
the implementation of policies and cooperative compliance; as Anderson &
Tverdova (2003) explain, “distrust of government may be detrimental to the
establishment and survival of democratic life in the long run” (p. 92). Without trust,
democratic governments may lose legitimacy and faith in democratic principles are
eroded. Therefore, trust is an important element to the survival of democracy
around the world.
Although there was no indication that levels of any form of trust were
declining across the 16 countries studied, this may be a result of having such a small
and heterogenous group of countries in the sample. Future studies should take into
account different regional and economic realities of countries studied. For
instance, is trust declining more in post-industrial, established democracies than in
industrial, newly established democracies? Is there a difference in trust between

former colonizer countries and colonized countries? These investigations will allow
a more robust analysis into any actual declines of trust occurring.
Alongside previous research, this paper reaffirms the importance of trust to
the legitimacy of governments and to democracy. Understanding the determinants
of various forms of trust is necessary to reinvigorate trust in government the world
over.
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